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The Battle of 
Prairie Grove, 

December 7, 1862 



O O 'O o o o o 

o o o o o o o 



By SAMUEL JONES, 

Formerly Major- General, 

C. S, Army. 



h 



The Battle of Prairie Grove, 
Dec. 7, 1862. 

[The following- account of the battle 
of Prairie Grove is taken from the 
Southern Bivouac, published at Lou- 
isville, Ky., and was written by Sam- 
uel Jones, Formerly Major-General, 
C. S. Army.] 

On Sunday, the 7th day of Decem- 
ber, 1862, in Washington County, in 
the northwestern part of Arkansas, and 
near the Indian Territory, an engage- 
ment took place between the Union 
and Confederate forces called the "Bat- 
tle of Fayetteville" or "Illinois Creek," 
but which is better known as the "Bat- 
tle of Prairie Grove," which had an im- 
portant bearing on subsequent military 
operations in the Trans-Mississippi 
part of the country. 

There are on file in the War Depart- 
ment in Washington forty ofllcial re- 
ports and congratulatory addresses to 
the troops, written by officers engaged 
purporting to give correct statements 
of the battle and the preliminary move- 
ments and skirmishes. Thirty-one of 
these documents are by Union and 
nine by Confederate officers. 

With such a mass of official informs 



tion available, it would seem that a 
clear and truthful history of the battle 
might readily be written; yet so ob- 
scure, confused, and contradictory are 
these official records, that it is impos- 
sible to write an intelligible and ac- 
curate narrative of the engagement 
which shall be consistent in itself and 
with the official records. 

Discrepencies as to the particulars 
of a battle naturally occur in the re- 
ports from the different sides. Even 
when no strong influences operate on 
the writers to give a descriptive tone 
and coloring to their reports, the fact 
that they view the engagement from 
different standpoints, and that no ob- 
server can see all that is passing over 
an extensive field, may very naturally 
lead them into conflicting statements. 
In this instance, however, the differ- 
ences are unusually wide and radical. 

For instance. General Thomas C. 
Hindman, commanding the Confeder- 
ate forces, states that he carried into 
the engagement less than ten thousand 
men of all arms. He estimated the 
enemy's force at from fourteen thous- 
and to eighteen thousand, with sixty 
pieces of artillery; and their losses to 
have been about 1,900, while his own 



ware 1,317. General James G. Blunt, 
commanding the Union forces, says he 
had in the engagement only seven 
thousand men; that General Hindman 
admitted his own force in the engage- 
ment to have been twenty-eight thous- 
and; that the Confederate loss, in kill- 
ed on the field was 1,000, and the 
wounded exceeded 2,000 (General Her- 
ron, next to Blunt in rank on the Union 
side, thinks the Confederate loss in all 
will reach from 5,000 to 8,000), while 
his own total loss in kill, wounded, and 
missing was only 1,148. Both Generals 
Hindman and Blunt, when in conversa- 
tion under flag of truce the day after 
the battle seem, with much frankness, 
to have admitted defeat — and yet in 
official reports General Hindman states 
that at the close of the engagement 
the enemy fled beyond the prairie, and 
he adds: "At dark the battle closed, 
leaving us masters of every foot of 
ground on which it was fought." 

On the other hand. General Blunt 
reports officially that both General 
Marmaduke (now Governor of Mis- 
souri) and General Hindman "acknowl- 
edged to me in an interview under flag 
of truce that they had been well whip- 
ped," and in an address to his troops 



five days after the battle he congratu- 
lates th^m on having gained in that 
battle complete success and a brilli- 
ant victory, and adds: "No battle 
duvirg the present war has been more 
determined and bloody, and never was 
Llii.^e a fiold upon which, considering 
the number of troops engaged, and the 
tim3 occupied, the slaughter was as 
great." 

Even the minor incidents preced- 
iiig an engagement are greatly magni- 
fied — not to use a stronger term. Gen- 
eral Marmaduke mentions that on the 
fifth two of his advancing brigades 
engaged the enemy's pickets and drove 
them back, whereas General Blunt re- 
ports that on the same day his pickets 
encountered the enemy in vastly su- 
perior numbers and drove them six 
y.ii'es into the mountians. 

It is impossible to wholly reconcile 
such contradictory statements. Nev- 
ertheless, when divested of redundant 
exaggeration and vain boasting, and 
when, the residuum is clearly analyz- 
ed, the reports disclose the salient and 
most important incidents of a well- 
contested and unusually bloody en- 
gagement, in which the numbers en- 
fraf^ed a^id the losses sustained were 



strikingly near equality, and which, 
with some notable exceptions, was 
highly creditable to the endurance and 
valor of the troops engaged. 

On the 3rd of December, 1862, the 
First division, Bragadier - General 
James G. Blunt commanding, of the 
Army of the Frontier was on Cane 
Hill, about twelve miles southwest of 
Fayetteville, in the northwestern part 
of Arkansas. The Second and Third 
divisions of the same army, both divis- 
ions commanded by Brigadier-Gen- 
eral Herron, were en echelon from 
Wilson's Creek, Missouri, about one 
hundred miles from Fayetteville, to- 
ward the latter place. In the absence 
of Major-General Schofield, Brigadier- 
General Blunt was in command of the 
Army of the Frontier. 

On the same date the First corps of 
the Trans-Mississippi Army, Major- 
General Thomas C. Hindman com- 
manding, was in the vicinity of Van 
Buren, Arkansas. That solction of 
country was destitute of food, and the 
Arkansas River was too low for navi- 
gation. The scant rations for the men 
and forage for the cavalry horses and 
draft animals was hauled about eighty 
miles to their camps. General Hind- 



man was convinced that it would very 
soon be necessary to move the greater 
part of his command to tlie vicinity of 
Little Rock to subsist it. But it would 
not be safe to leave a small force near 
Van Buren while the enemy occupied 
Cane Hill in force. Knowing that one 
division, the First, estimated at from 
seven to eight thousand men, with 
thirty pieces of artillery, occupied 
Cane Hill, and that the other two 
divisions of the Army of the Frontier 
were from seventy to one hundred 
miles away to the north, General Hind- 
man determined to attack the First 
division at Cane Hill and destroy or 
drive it off before it could be joined 
by the Second and Third divisions. 

Cane Hill is a ridge of about eight 
miles in length by about five in width 
in the southwestern part of Washing- 
ton County, Arkansas, and just beyond 
the northern base of Boston Moun- 
tain. There are three villages, Rus- 
sellville, Boonsborough, and New- 
burg, merging into each other and 
stretching from three to five miles 
along the ridge road to Fayetteville. 
The main body of the Union force, 
under General Blunt, was in *and 
around Newburg. 



Ihe distance from Van Buren to 
iSlswburg is forty-five miles. The in- 
termediate country is a rugged and 
sterile range of mountains. The four 
principal roads across those mountains 
diverging from Van Buren converge 
on Fayetteville. One of these roads 
bending to the east and following Frog 
Bayou, crosses the mountains.then fol- 
lowing the west fork of White River, 
enters Fayetteville from the south- 
cast; another, called the telegraph 
road, runs generally upon mountain 
ridges directly northward; a third 
branching off from the telegraph 
road about twelve miles from Vun 
Buren, follows the Cherokee line to 
Evansville, thence north by Cincin- 
nati and Maysville to Fort Scott. 
From Evansville there is a road 
through the Cane Hill country to Fay- 
etteville. At Olivers, nineteen miles 
from Van Buren on the telegraph road, 
another branch road turns off to the 
left, following the valley of Cove Creek 
to the base of the mountains, and after 
crossing them, passing tnrough a suc- 
cession of defiles, valleys, and prairies, 
enters Fayetteville from the south- 
west. At Morrows, fifteen miles north 
of Olivers, a branch of the Cove Creek 



road starts and leads directly to New- 
burg, seven miles distant. Eight miles 
above Morrows the Cove Creek road 
is crossed by another leading from 
Keg Eye, five miles to the east on the 
telegraph road, directly to Newburg. 
Two miles further on a branch road 
leads by Rhea's Mill to Maysville, and 
crosses the Cane Hill and Fayetteville 
road two miles from the Cove Creek 
road at a point seven and a half miles 
from Newburg, twelve and a half miles 
from Fayetteville, and two and a half 
miles from the junction of the Cove 
Creek with the Cane Hill and Fayette- 
ville roads. The distance from Van 
Buren to Fayetteville is fifty miles by 
the shortest and sixty-five by the long- 
est of these roads. 

Having, with diflficulty and much 
:abor, accumulated half rations for sev- 
en days, General Hindman moved 
r-orthward on the 3rd of December, 
with nine thousand infantry, two thous- 
and and three hundred cavalry, and 
tv/enty-two pieces of artillery. Lack of 
shoes and arms prevented him from 
taking his entire force. He expected, 
and so stated in a dispatch to the De- 
partment Commander, to return to the 
vicinity of Van Buren immediately 



alter the engagement he was seeking, 
because he had barely ammunition 
enough for a single battle, and but 
scant subsistance and forage for seven 
days on half rations. 

General Marmaduke's cavalry divis- 
ion of three brigades, Shelley's, Mac- 
Donald's, and Carol's, which was al- 
ready well advanced northward, mov- 
ed in advance from Dripping Springs. 
Shelley's brigade of about eleven hun- 
dred men followed the Cove Creek 
road, MacDonald's, of about seven 
hur.dred men, the telegraph road, and 
Carol's, reduced to about five hundred 
effective, and commanded by Colonel 
Monroe, moved on the most westerly 
road which nearly follows the line of 
the Creek or Indian Nation. Colonel 
Watts with his Cherokee regiment was 
ordered to Svansville, with instruc- 
tiors when he heard the firing to move 
forward and occupy certain mills in 
the Cane Hill country, and attack the 
enemy's trains should they, as was an- 
ticipated, retreat in that direction. 

The two infantry divisions under 
Generals Shoup and Frost marched 
on the telegraph road and bivouacked 
at Oliver's on the night of the 4th. 
There ne\vs was received that Gener- 



10 



al Blunt had been reinforced by three 
thousand or four thousand men. It 
was not until the 6tli that the infantry 
reached Morrows. It will be seen that 
tn-j marcn was excessively slow, 
thirty-four miles from the 3rd to the 
6th, due to the bad condition of the 
roads and the draft animals, and to 
•'seme of those apparently unavoid- 
able delays to which troops so ill-pro- 
vided as ours are liable," says General 
Hindman. 

On the 5th, Colonel Monroe's small 
cavalry brigade marched across and 
joined Shelley's brigade on the Cove 
Crsek road, both brigades moving on 
the latter, while MacDonald pressed 
forward on the telegraph road. Dur- 
ing the day Colonel Shelley's advance 
encountered a large scouting party of 
the enemy, which made a bold bash at 
the advancing foe, but Colonel Jean's 
Second Missouri Cavalry met find 
drove them several miles back. At 
night Shelley came upon a strong out- 
post occupied by the Second Kansas 
ra.aky at the junction of the Cane 
Hi'l and Cove Creek roads. 

Before day-dawn on the 6th, Shelley 
threw his brigade, dismounted, on the 
Second Kansas, which, after a highly 



11 



creditable stand against superior num- 
bers, retired and was pursued to with- 
in two miles of the main body of the 
First division, at Newburg. There, 
i"rom the crest of the mountain to its 
base, about sunset, a sharp combat 
occurred, in which Colonel I. C. Mon- 
roe and his brigade of Arkansas cav- 
alry who had relieved Colonel Shelley 
greatly distinguished themselves. Col- 
onel Hunter's regiment of Missouri 
infantry of Parscn's brigade of Pro&t's 
division soon occupied the ground 
which Colonel Monroe's cavalry had 
gained, and was joined there by the 
remainder of Parson's brigade to hold 
the heights and defiles. Thus, as the 
night of the 6th set in, the Confeder- 
ates were in full possession of the 
Cove Creek road above and below its 
junction with the Cane Hill road, the 
greater part massed close to the Union 
outposts. 

On the morning of the 3rd, General 
Blunt telegraphed General Herron, 
near Wilson's Creek, Missouri, of 
Hindman's advance, and ordered him 
to hasten with all speed by forced 
marches to join him, and especially to 
hasten forward his cavalry, which was 
in ad^rance near Cassville. These or- 



Vi 



ders were promptly obeyed, and the 
march was made with rapidity and 
endurance highly creditable to the 
troops. 

The advance Federal cavalry was in 
supporting distance of General Blunt 
on the 5th. The rear division (the 
Seco::d) of infantry arrived in Fay- 
etteville at 3 o'clock on the morning 
of the 7th, and the commander, Col- 
onel Dye (at present Chief of Folic;-' 
of the District- of Columbia), being 
then informed of the urgent need of 
the junction of his division with Gen- 
eral Biunt's, hastened forward with- 
out rest or food. 

The prompt and rapid march of the 
Second and Third to join the Fir' v 
division had snatched from General 
Hindman the chance of attacking the 
First division alone. 

Or the night uf the 6th General 
Hindman called all of his general off'c- 
ers together for consultation, and in- 
forming them that information had 
reached him that General Herron, with 
two divisions, was then at or near 
Fayetteville and hastening to form a 
junction with General Blunt, desired 
their opinions as to the best courso to 
pursue. The Confederate force was 



13 



at that time on the Cane Hill i-oad, 
and six or seven miles distant from 
the mass of Blount's force. The Con- 
federate commander had no time for 
hesitation or delay. He had started 
on the expedition with but half rations 
for seven days, and was then at the 
close of the fourth day. To withdraw 
v/ithout fighting at all would probably 
demoralize his troops and perhaps em- 
bolden the enemy to follow and force 
an engagement under even greater dis- 
advantages than then confronted him. 
Near the point where the troops 
were then bivouacked there was an 
other road leading off to the right 
which, after crossing the mountain 
ridge, came into the road in rear of 
Cane Hill, upon which Herron was ap- 
proaching. There was a possibility 
that by leaving a small and aggressive 
force in General Biunt's front, to oc- 
cupy his attention and produce the im- 
pression that he was to be attacked in 
front in force, Hindman could, by tak- 
ing this last mentioned road, throw the 
main body of his force against Herron, 
then known to be marching from Fay- 
etteville toward Cane Hill, defeat and 
disperse his command, and then turn 
upon and engage Blunt on equal terms. 



H 



General Marmaduke strongly advocat- 
ed this plan. With two supporting 
divisions so near him General Blunt, if 
attacked in front, would in all prob- 
ability withdraw northward to hasten 
a junction with Gener'al Herron, and 
thus by their combined force turn the 
balance of probabilities of success de- 
cidedly against the Confederates. 

General Shoup on the other hand as 
strongly urged that they should move 
promptly forward on the direct road, 
so as to begin the attack at early 
dawn. The road by which it was pro- 
posed to make the detour to the rear 
of Cane Hill was about double as long 
as the one which would bring them 
directly upon Blunt's main body. If 
the detour were made, it was more 
than probable, from information re- 
ceived as to General Herron's march, 
that when the Confederate columns 
debouched into the main road in rear 
of Cane Hill, they would have both 
Blunt and Herron upon them, and the 
result might well prove disastrous. 
After mature deliberation, General 
Hindman decided to make the detour. 

Colonel Monroe was ordered to re- 
main on the crest of the mountain with 
his cavalry brigade, and at daylight 



15 



to skirmish briskly as infantry with 
the force in his front, to delude the 
enemy and detain him at Newbiirg as 
long as possible, and to push hin; 
vigorously when lie commenced to re- 
tire. At midnight Colonel Parsons, 
after replenishing his camp-fires, mov- 
ed back to Morrows. The trains were 
ordered by a cross-road to the tele- 
graph road and thence to Kog Eye, 
guarded by one iiiii:d''cd cavalry and 
the disabled infantry, of whom there 
were many. Those arrangements left 
General Hindman less than ten thous- 
and men of all arms to carry into the 
impending engagement. 

The command was ordered to move 
forward at 3 a. m., but was not in 
motion until nearly 4 a. m., on the 
Cove Creek road and its Maysville 
branch to the Cane Hill and Fayette- 
ville road. The roads were so ex- 
cessively bad and the battery horses 
so reduced and debilitated that the 
two infantry divisions did not march 
more than two miles per hour. Mar- 
maduke's cavalry moved with more 
speed on the Cove Creek road. 

General Blunt, ascertaining on the 
morning of the 7th that the Confeder- 
ate commander had left only a small 



16 



lorce, Monroe's cavalry, to engage his 
attention in front while the main force 
was making a flank march to his left 
to intercept and engage General Her- 
ron, then marching rapidly from Fay- 
etteville toward Cane Hill, dispatched 
his train, guarded by the Third Indi- 
ana regiment, on the road to Rhea's 
Mill; the whole of the First division, 
preceded b)y Colonel Wickersham's 
cavalry brigade the Third division, 
was ordered to move rapidly in the 
direction of Fayetteville to form a 
junction with General Herron. After 
marching about three miles the cav- 
alry commander by some mistake took 
the road to Rhea's Mills, instead of 
the one to Fayetteville, and was fol- 
lowed by the infantry, thus defeating 
the purpose of forming a quick junc- 
tion with General Herron. 

General Marmaduke with Shelley's 
and MacDonald's brigade of his cav- 
alry division reached the junction of 
the Cove Creek with the Cane Hill 
and Fayetteville road about day-dawn 
and there ascertained that a cavalry 
force was but half a mile distant in 
his from. Leaving a part of Shelley's 
brigade and Bledsoe's artillery at that 
point to resist the enemy coming from 



17 



either direction, he sent the remainder 
of that brigade forward toward Fay- 
etteville to attack the advancing Fed- 
erals in front, while MacDonald's bri- 
gade moved rapidly to attack in flank 
and rear. 

The Federal force immediately in 
froDt was the First Arkar«sas (Fed- 
eral) cavalry, Colonel Harrison com 
manding, and Seventh Missouri cav- 
alry. Both regiments had just made 
forced marches, the latter having 
arrived and bivouacked at that point 
about midnight. They were unpre- 
pared and completely surprised; after 
a few shots many men threw down 
their arms and surrendered ; the others 
fled, throwing away their arms and 
all that could impede their flight, and, 
hotly pursued by MacDonald's two 
regiments, Young's and Crump's. Gen- 
eral Herron's advance guard, the First 
battalion, First Missouri cavalry, was 
unable to stem the torrent of fugi- 
tives, and in attempting to check the 
pursuit were severely handled, losing 
the commander. Major Hubbard, cap- 
tured. The pursuit was continued four 
or five miles, to within six miles of 
Fayetteville, where the main column 
of the Federal forces was met. "-It 



18 



was with great difficulty," says Gen- 
eral Herron, "that we got them (the 
flying cavalr^^men) checked, and pre- 
vented a general stampede of the bat- 
tery horses; but, after some hard talk- 
ing and my finally shooting one cow- 
ardly whelp off his horse, they halted." 

Colonel Harrison, who had reached 
the point where he was surprised by 
the enemy, had reported to General 
Blunt that his regiment was so ex- 
hausted that he could not march be- 
fore Monday the 8th. 

"Whether his regard for the Sabbath 
or the fear of getting into a fight 
prompted him to make such a report 
to me, I am unable to say; but judging 
from his movements that he was not a 
man upon whom to place much reli- 
ance on the battlefield. I ordered him 
to proceed by daybreak to Rhea's Mills 
to guard the transportation and supply 
trains at that point, the first brigade 
having been ordered to join me at 
Cane Hill. Had he, instead of making 
unnecessary delay, promptly obeyed 
that order, he would not have had a 
part of his command and transporta- 
tion captured by General Marmaduke's 
advance, as occurred on the morning 
of the 7th." 



19 



In the headlong fight and pursuit the 
Confederates captured about two hun- 
dred prisioners, five hundred rifles and 
small arms, forty wagons and teams 
with blankets and all manner of army- 
clothing and commissary stores, which 
were promptly secured and sent to the 
rear. General Herron's infantry and 
artillery soon arrested Marmaduke's 
pursuits, who, finding himself in the 
face of the main body of the enemy, 
drew off his cavalry and fell back 
across Illinois Creek to join the in- 
fantry divisions of the Confederate 
force, closely followed by General 
Herron. 

In the meantime, from 4 to 11 o'clock 
in the morning, the divisions of Gen- 
erals Shoup and Frost were toiling 
over bad roads, so exhausted from lack 
of food it would seem that though 
lapidity of march was essential to suc- 
cess, they had marched but fifteen 
miles in seven days. They had been 
on half rations for more than a month, 
had eaten nothing since the day be- 
fore, and many, overcome by fatigue, 
had fallen by the roadside. 

General Shoup, who commanded the 
leading division, finding that General 
Marmaduke was falling back before 



20 



the enemy's infantry, placed his divis- 
ion in position to meet an expected 
attack. He had with admirable judg- 
ment selected a strong defensive posi- 
tion, which gave the name to the en- 
casement that followed. 

It was upon the brow of a densely 
wooded hill, descending abruptly to 
Crawford's Prairie, half a mile in 
width, encircling the northern half of 
the hill; three quarters of a mile to 
the north, and between the hill and 
the advancing enemy, ran Illinois 
Creek, easily fordable but thickly 
bordered. Five hundred yards in rear 
to the south of the hill was another 
prairie. Between the two prairies on 
the right and left were skirts of woods 
connecting the timber of the hill with 
that beyond. On the summit of the 
hill was Prairie Grove Church. The 
Cane Hill and Fayetteville road tra-^ 
verses the middle line of this, hill, 
passing by the church, where it is 
crossed by another road connecting 
the Cane Hill and Fayetteville with 
the Cove Creek road, dividing the 
south prairie from the timber upon 
the hill. This position had been reach- 
ed by the Confederates about 1 o'clock 
a. m., too late to engage General Her- 



21 



roll's command alone, as had been de- 
signed. 

"The interval of time in which I 
might have attacked Herron was past. 
Circumstances did not permit me to 
avail myself of it for the manifest 
reason that at the favorable moment 
the rear of my column could not be 
where the head of it was." 

Finding himself between Blunt and 
Herron, the former four or five miles 
to the left and rear, the latter a mile 
c: two in front and advancing, Hind- 
man, in a brief conference, had been 
advised by General Shoup to leave as 
small a force as could be relied on to 
hold the strong position about Prairie 
Grove Church against Herron, and as 
quickly as possible turn and throw the 
main body againsts Blunt; and when 
asked what force could probably hold 
Herron in check, Shoup replied that 
ho thought he could do it with his two 
brigades, new conscripts though they 
were. He was directed to undertake 
it, and immediately proceeded to make 
his dispositions accordingly, under the 
impression that the main body would 
move against Blunt. Hindman seems, 
however, to have changed his mind, 
and passing from the aggressive to the 



32 



defensive attitude, decided to receive 
both Blunt and Herron at and about 
Prairie Grove. The shape of the hill 
determined the line of battle, which 
was nearly in the form of a horseshoe. 
Shoup, who supposed his division alone 
was to receive Herron's attack, or- 
dered up his only battery to sweep the 
ford over the little stream which Her- 
ron's advance guard had just reached, 
placed Pagan's brigade along the crest 
of the hill and held the other brigade 
en echelon in the rear to aid in the at- 
tack on Blunt, if necessary, or as a 
second line to hold Herron, if Pagan's 
brigade should not be able to with- 
stand the attack. The troops were 
carefully instructed, and had it im- 
pressed upon them to reserve their 
fire until the enemy approached to 
within short and effective range, and 
having delivered their fire deliberately, 
not to stand and receive, but to spring 
forward and meet every charge, and 
these instructions were admirably 
obeyed. Shelley's brigade, dismount- 
ed, occupied the center of the line on 
Shoup's left; his and Shoup's com- 
mands confronting Herron, who was 
rapidly forming on a bluff beyond the 
prairie to the north. Frost's division. 



23 



to which had been added the brigade 
of Texans, with Clark's Missouri regi- 
ment, commanded by Brigadier-Gen- 
eral Roane, was held in reserve. Mac- 
Donald's brigade, composed of his own 
regiment of Missouri cavalry, Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel M. L. Young, command- 
ing, and Lane's regiment of Texas 
cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel R. P. 
Crump commanding, was held in readi- 
ness to meet any attempt to turn either 
flank.. 

To feel the Confederate position, 
Herron ordered a section of Battery 
E, First Missouri light artillery, sup- 
ported by the Ninety-fourth Illinois 
infantry, to cross the creek on the 
main road and open fire, but the ford 
was within range of the Confederate 
guns, which quickly caused the sec- 
tion and its support to re-cross the 
creek. Convinced that Hindman's 
whole force was immediately in front 
of him, Herron decided to attack Im- 
mediately, rightly conjecturing that 
his fire would draw Blunt to his sup- 
port. 

To cover the passage of the creek 
on the main road. Colonel Houston, 
commanding the second division, cut a 
passage through the timber to the 



creek half a mile from the road, and 
carried across Battery F (Murphy's) 
First Missouri light artillery of six 
guns, three of which, under Lieuten- 
ant Marr, took a commanding position 
in the open field ;^ the other three, 
under Captain Murphy, took a more 
elevated position about four hundred 
yards to the right, the Thirty-seventh 
Illinois infantry supporting the half 
battery on the right, the Twentieth 
Iowa that on the left, the Twenty-sixth 
Indiana infantry in reserve. About 
midday a rapid and well-aimed fire 
from these guns drew the Confederate 
fire upon them, and under cover of it 
three other batteries — Captain Back- 
of's, and Lieutenants Foust's and Bor- 
ries' — supported by the Nineteenth 
Iowa, Twentieth Wisconsin, and Nine- 
ty-fourth Illinois infantry, passed over 
the creek, and soon the twenty-four 
field-pieces were in active play on the 
Confederate position, and continued 
for about an hour. In that time, says 
Herron, the Confederate batteries were 
silenced; but Hindman says he order- 
ed his guns to cease firing, it would 
seem, to tempt the enemy to assault 
his position. If that was his object, it 
succeeded. The second division, under 



25 



Colonel Huston, and third, under Gen- 
eral Herron in person, were in line of 
battle. The second brigade^ third 
division, Colonel Orme commanding, 
was* moved to the left to meet what 
seemed a threatened attack on that 
flank. The advance of the infantry 
and artillery across the broad open 
field was made with admirable steadi- 
ness, winning the admiration of their 
enemy — the artillery, which was ex- 
cellent, firing rapidly and with telling 
effect while advancing. When within 
a hundred yards of the ridge the 
Twentieth Wisconsin and Nineteenth 
Iowa of Colonel Bertram's brigade 
were ordered to charge a battery in 
position near a farm house The 
charge was hai':lsomely made, the 
nattery captr.ved and the' two regi- 
ments passed on to the crest of the 
ridge. They were permitted to ap- 
proach to within sixty or seventy yards 
of the line when Fagan's Arkansas 
brigade, a part of McRae's and the 
Missourians under Shelley opened a 
withering fire from their rifles, mus- 
kets, and shot-guns, then sprang for- 
ward in a counter-charge, drove the 
enemy back and pursued them far into 
the prairie until checked by the effect- 



::g 



ive fire of the -Union batteries. Col- 
onel Hawthorn's Arkansas regiment 
recaptured the battery which had been 
taken in charge. The slaughter in this 
charge and counter-charge was very 
great — the ground was thickly strewn 
with the killed and wounded, among 
the killed being Colonel McFarland 
commanding the Nineteenth Iowa. 
Colonel Huston having been ordered 
to support the infantry of the third 
division in the charge, led in person 
the Twenty-sixth Indiana and Thirty- 
seventh Illinois at double-quick. Find- 
ing the column of the third division 
which had just been repulsed so badly 
cut up as to need time to re-form, he 
led his two regiments up the hill to 
assail the Confederates in position. 
This line, like the first, was permitted 
to approach to within seventy-five or 
one hundred yards, when Shoup's in- 
fantry, which was lying down, con- 
cealed by thick undergrowth, rose and 
poured a most destructive fire into the 
advancing line which withstood and re- 
turned it with admirable steadiness 
for a few minutes, then fell back in 
confusion, but reformed beyond mus- 
ket range from the foot of the hill 
where it remained to the close of the 



27 



action. The two regiments liad lost 
nearly a third of their numbers in kill- 
ed and wounded. The Twenty-sixth 
Indiana lost nearly one half of the 
number carried into action. 

General Blunt, with the first division, 
was at or near Rhea's Mills, ahout f]Ye 
miles to the west from the field of 
battle, when he heard the rapid artill 
ery-firing with which the engagement 
opened. Leaving the first brigade of 
his division to guard the trains at 
Rhea's Mills, he immediately marched 
with the second and third brigades, by 
an obscure road, to the sound of the 
guns, and arrived on the field about 2 
o'clock. Entering by the western ex- 
tremity of the prairie, he formed line 
of battle about tw^o thousand yards 
distant from the Confederate line. The 
left of his line connected with Colonel 
Dye's brigade, the second brigade, sec- 
ond division, wliich was on the right 
of Herron's command. The arrival of 
the first division inspired with new 
spirit the two other divisions which, 
greatly exhausted ,by long forced 
marches, had already lost heavily in 
the two unsuccessful assaults. 

Rabb's, Terry's, and Hopkin's bat- 
teries, of six pieces each, were quickly 



23 



placed in position, and in concert with 
Herron's three batteries twenty-four 
guns opened a rapid and destructive 
fire, the prelude to an advance of the 
infantry along the whole Union line. 
The well-known military principle, 
that with new troops die proportion of 
a''tillery to the other arms of service 
should be much increased, was strik- 
ingly exemplified in this engagement. 
From its beginning to its end, the 
Lrjion artillery, which seems to have 
been excellent, a^id admirably served. 
played a most conspicuous part, and. 
as may be gathered from the ofllcial 
reports, saved the Union army from 
disastrous defeat. The Confederate 
artillery, on the contrary, was very 
inferior and did not play a conspicu- 
ous part in the engagemont. 
When Blunt's force appeared on the 
field, Frost's division, till now held in 
reserve, was thrown in on Shelley's 
left to meet it. Its movement into 
position was much impeded by the 
dense undergrowth and the desirac- 
tive artillery-fire. Under cover of Ibis 
fire the infantry advanced along the 
whole line, General Herron renewed 
his assault on Shoup's position, \vhi(^h 
had been so tenaciously held, and the 



29 



troops under General Blunts immedi- 
ate command were thrown forward in- 
to the woods and engaged riosTa 
division. Colonel Weir led the Tenth 
and Thirteenth Kansas regiments of 
his brigade upon the right. A parr, of 
ill 3 Second Kar sas cavalry, dismount- 
ed, under Captain Crawford, the right 
wing of the Eleventh Kansas infaniry 
under Colonel Ewing, and the First 
Indian reglmsnt under Colonel Wat- 
tles, upon the left. The TwentietJi 
Iowa, of Colonel Dye's brigade of thd 
Lccond cliv'sicn, was led by Colonel 
Dye himself on the left of the Indians. 
The left wing of the Eleventh Kansas 
Infantry, Lieutenant - Colonel Moon- 
light commanding, supported Rabb's 
and Hopkin's batteries. Colonel Wick 
ersham's cavalry viz., the First lowa^ 
Tenth Illinois, Eighth Missouri, Third 
Vv^isconsin, and the first battalion of 
the Second Wisconsin, were on the 
extreme right of the Union line 
to watch any movement against 
that flank, and guard the road leading 
to the supply train at Rhea's Mill. By 
3 o'clock the whole infantry force and 
part of 'the dismounted cavalry, and 
forty-two field-pieces of the Army o^' 
the Frontier were hotly engaged, and 



30 



so continued for three hours. The last 
assault upon Shoup's position was 
most determined, and succcedod in 
gaining the crest of the ridge and in 
driving his right some distance back; 
'out when the assailants emerged from 
the wood into an open space near a 
small cabin the Confederate fire be- 
came too sure and deadly to be with- 
stood. The advancing line wavered, 
broke, and retired, and was not again 
rallied. The loss on this part of the 
field was especially heavy, and such 
as men who had served in the most 
sanguinary battle> of the war up to 
that time had never before witnessed. 

The Federal and Confederate ac- 
counts of this confiict of three hours 
duration are exceedingly confused. 

"The contest by this time (about 3 
p. m.)" says General Blunt, "had be- 
come vigorous and determined. The 
etitire infantry of the three divisions, 
and also a portion of the Second Kan- 
sas (dismounted),- were er.gag-ed m 
the woods with the rebel infantry, 
three times their number. The rattle 
of musketry, uninterrupted for fully 
three hours, was terrific. The con- 
tending armies swayed to and fro* 
each alternately advancing and retir- 



31 



ing .... While the infantiry was 
vigorously contesting every inch of 
ground, I directed Lieutenant Stoner, 
with tv/o twelve-pounder mountain 
howitzers to advance into the woods, 
Vvhich he promptly did, taking posi- 
tion on a little knoll on the right of 
the Eleventh Kansas; and, directing 
his guns across a small field where a 
heavy force of rebels were massed, he 
poured into them his canister and 
shell until his ammunition was ex- 
hausted and his horses shot down, be- 
ing compelled to bring away his guns 
by hand. Lieutenant Tenny was then 
ordered in with his battery. From 
his six ten-pcunder Parrott guns he 
opened on them with terrible effect, 
driving them back with great slaugh- 
ter." 

A little later he ordered his infantry 
to withdraw from the wood "in order 
to draw the enemy from under cover 
and within range of my artillery. On 
reaching the open field on their right 
just alluded to, I discovered the en- 
tire division of General Frost advanc- 
ed to the edge of the timber and about 
two hundred yards distant. They 
opened upon us a fierce fire from En- 
field rifles, and were in the act of 



32 



throwing down the fence to make an 
assault on the battery, which had no 
support except my own staff and 
body-guard, but Lieutenant Tenny 
with commendable promptness wheel 
Gd his guns into position, when the de- 
structive fire of cannister and sliell 
soon sent tlip rebel hordes back under 

cover of the wood 

The enemy followed up my infancy 
ac they retired from the wood, and 
with a wild shout rushed out from un- 
der cover of the trees, when the two 
batteries (Rabb's and Hopkins'), sup- 
ported by the infantry of the Eleventh 
regiment, belched forth a perfect 
storm of canister, producing immense 
slaughter in the ranks and compelling 
them again to retire. As darkness 
approached, the fire, which from both 
artillery and musketry had been terri- 
fic and uninterrupted for over three 
hours, gradually ceased along the 
whole line, and my command biv- 
ouacked upon their arms, ready to re- 
view the conflict at early dawn." 

General Hindman, reporting the 
opsrations after Blunt's arrival on the 
field, says: 

"Blunt had now formed line of bat- 
tle two thousand yards to the front 



33 



and left of Shoup, and commenced ad- 
vancing. I ordered Frost's division 
formed on the left of Marmaduke. The 
thick undergrowth on that flank ren- 
dered it difficult to execute the move- 
ment, which was further embarrassed 
by the well-directed and determined 
fire of the enemy's batteries. There 
was, however, no confusion. By the 
time Frost's division was in line the 
enemy was nearly across the prairie, 
and our skirmishers engaged his al- 
most as soon as deployed. His attack 
was divided against Parson's brigade. 
It was fierce and prolonged, but ended 
in his being driven back in disorder 
with heavy losses. One of Marma- 
duke's regiments and one of Roane's 
(both Missourians) shared the honor 
of this brilliant achievement. 

"The enemy now brought up all his 
artillery, many pieces of which were 
rifled, and endeavored to shake our 
troops by playing upon the entire line 
nearly an hour. Then he attacked 
with all his infantry, at the same time 
threatening the extreme left with a 
heavy cavalry force, and attempting 
to turn the right. MacDonald's Mis- 
souri cavalry defeated him in the last 
maneuver. Lane's Texas cavalry and 



34 



Roane's brigade deterred him from 
seriously assailing the left, and 
Shoup's division, Shelley's brigade of 
Marmaduke's division, and Parson's 
and Shaner's brigades "of Frost's divis- 
ion, gloriously repulsed him in his 
desperate attack upon the lines. He 
again fled beyond the prairie, leaving 
his dead and wounded and the colors 
of several of his regiments in our 
hands besides a number of prisoners. . 

"A furious cannonade was kept up 
by the enemy until near sunset; then 
a last attack of his infantry was di- 
rected against the line held by Frost. 
This was a most determined effort to 
retrieve the fortunes of the day. It 
signally failed, and the enemy paid 
dearly in killed and wounded for the 
attempt. At dark the battle closed, 
leaving us masters of every foot of the 
ground on which it was fought." 

Colonel Weir, commanding second 
brigade, first division, says of this 
thiee hours' engagement: 

"The firing was general and very 
rapid with occasional lull^, during 
v^hich we several times attempted to 
pass the brow of the hill and engage 
the enemy in close quarters. We were 
as often repulsed by the rain of bul- 



35 



lets. About dark, and while making a 
final attempt to pass over the brow of 
the hill, the enemy arose in the tim- 
ber, with loud yells surrounded us on 
all sides, and charged. The air was 
thick with bullets, and nothing saved 
us from annihilation but the protec- 
tion afforded by the brow of the hill. 
They must have been heavily reinforc- 
ed; and so overpowering were their 
numbers that we were compelled to 
yield before the charge and fall back. 
At this time, about dark, Rabb's bat- 
tery and Lieutenant Tenny with First 
Kansas battery on our right saved us 
from destruction. Their firing was so 
rapid and well directed that the enemy 
was compelled to fal] back, and we 
marched from the field in good order. 

It seems that on this, as on many 
other fields during the war, the fault 
was committed of attacking by de- 
tachments; sending a regiment, a bri- 
gade, a division, or a corps to do wha,t 
should have been done by a brigade, 
a division, a corps, or the army. The 
Federal commanders made repeated 
attempts between 2 o'clock and dark 
to carry the Confederate position by 
detachments, and were as repeatedly 
repulsed, and were saved from com- 



33 



plete defeat or much heavier loss than 
they sustained by their greatly super- 
ior force of artillery, which seems to 
have been bravely and skillfully hand- 
led. Night put an end to the bloody 
conflict, the Federal for'ces falling 
back beyond range, how far does not 
appear, the Confederates holding their 
position. The ground between the two 
was thicklj^ strewn with killed and 
wounded. General Herron reports 
that at one place between him and 
Shoup, on less than two acres of 
ground, lay three hundred men, Fed- 
eral and Confederate, killed and 
wounded. General Blunt reports the 
Federal loss in killed, wounded, and 
missing as 1,148. The Confederate 
loss, he said, could not fall short of 
.3,000, and would probably exceed that 
number, 1,000 being killed on the 
ground. General Hindman reports his 
own loss in killed, wounded, and miss- 
ing as 1,317. He estimated the Fed- 
eral loss at 1,900, and claims to have 
capture 275 prisoners, including nine 
officers. 

In consideration of the fact that he 
v/as in the presence of a superior force 
of the enemy; that his own men were 
without food, and his wagons thirty 



37 



miles in his rear, and could not be 
brought up witliout imminent risk of 
being captured; that his supply of 
ammunition was far below what would 
be necessary for another engagement, 
and that the battery animals were lit- 
erally dying of starvation, and could 
net be foraged in the presence of a 
superior force of the enemy, General 
Hindman determined to retire. Re- 
taining the main body of his cavalry 
to cover his front and picket the Cove 
Creek road two miles to the rear, he 
ordered his two infantry divisions to 
retire, and by midnight the rear-guard 
had passed out of hearing. 

The cavalry remaining upon the 
field was engaged in caring for the 
killed and wounded and in collecting 
arms, which were thickly scattered 
over the field. 

Both Generals Blunt and Herron 
report that their men rested on their 
a?ms during the night in readiness to 
resume the battle at early dawn. 

Nevertheless Blunt sent Dr. Parker 
of his staff under flag of truce with a 
note to Hindman asking a suspension 
of hostilities, that he might care for 
his killed and wounded. Dr. Parker 
indicated twelve hours from sunrise 



38 



the next morning as the duration of 
the truce. To this Hindman assented 
most willingly, no doubt, but, not re- 
ceiving an answer in writing arrang- 
ing the details, sent a second note sug- 
gesting a personal meeting. In ignor- 
ance of the fact that the main body of 
Hindman's force had been in rapid re- 
treat, General Blunt assented to the 
suggestion by a note dated at six 
o'clock in the morning of the 8th, and 
the meeting took place about ten 
o'clock. During the interview it was 
discovered that the Confederate Gen- 
erals Hindman and Marmaduke with a 
fev/ staff officers were in front of only 
a few cavalrymen who were busily 
engaged caring for the wounded and 
gathering arms. On discovering that 
if he had waited to send in his flag of 
truce until daylight the field of battle 
would have been his without a truce, 
Blunt was not a little chagrined, and 
some sharp controversy followed a day 
or two later as to the arms that were 
gathered on the field. About midday 
Hindman and Marmaduke retired with 
the cavalry, leaving the Union General 
in possession of the bloody field of 
Frairie Grove. 

SAMUEL JONES, 
Formerly Major-General, C. S. Army. 



/ 



